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ABSTRACT
Diagnostic testing can be used for many purposes, including testing
to facilitate the clinical care of individual patients, testing as an
inclusion criterion for clinical trial participation, and both passive
and active surveillance testing of the general population in order to
facilitate public health outcomes, such as the containment or
mitigation of an infectious disease. As such, diagnostic testing
presents us with ethical questions that are, in part, already addressed
in the literatures on clinical care as well as clinical research (such as
the rights of patients to refuse testing or treatment in the clinical
setting or the rights of participants in randomized controlled trials to
withdraw from the trial at any time). However, diagnostic testing, for
the purpose of disease surveillance also raises ethical issues that we
do not encounter in these settings, and thus have not been much
discussed. In this paper we will be concerned with the similarities and
differences between the ethical considerations in these three
domains: clinical care, clinical research, and public health, as they
relate to diagnostic testing specifically. Via an examination of the
COVID-19 case we will show how an appeal to the concept of
diagnostic justice helps us to make sense of the (at times competing)
ethical considerations in these three domains.
Keywords: diagnostic justice; philosophy of medicine; political philosophy;
applied ethics
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Introduction

The ongoing SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic, now (August 2021)
over 18 months old, has proved to be the greatest public health challenge
and most significant global health event since the 1919 H1N1 influenza
pandemic. This is so not just because of the scale, devastation, and human
toll of the pandemic, but also because of some of the unique features of the
disease itself. As has been well-documented, COVID-19 disproportionately
causes severe illness among older adults, especially older males with
certain underlying health conditions. The disease has entered the world at
a unique time in human history, when large portions of the population are
older and have age-related chronic conditions such as renal disease,
diabetes, and hypertension, meaning that many more living individuals are
susceptible to severe outcomes from this virus in a way that wouldn’t have
been the case a generation ago (Onder et al. 2020; Begley 2020). It has also
exposed an existing and pernicious set of underlying, unjust inequalities,
resulting in a distribution of mortality and morbidity that
disproportionately impacts communities of color and low-income workers
in developed countries (Hooper et al. 2020), as well as long-standing,
pernicious inequalities in health care provision and access to medicines
that exist between developed and developing countries.
One of the major challenges of the pandemic has been diagnostic testing
for SARS-CoV-2 infection. Because of the danger of asymptomatic and
pre-symptomatic transmission, testing is required in order to bring
transmission of the disease under control, as it is the primary way in which
to identify asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic cases and thus to control
transmission via isolation of these individuals (Furukawa et al. 2020).
Countries that have done well with testing (such as South Korea and
Singapore) have fared better than other countries where testing has been
more limited, such as the United States (Cheng et al. 2020). But testing in
the context of this pandemic is, as in medicine and health care practice
more generally, done for different purposes, and sorting through the
rationale for COVID-19 testing, its different uses, and its relevance in
different settings is a major conceptual and normative issue raised by the
pandemic and the public health response to it.
Even aside from the COVID-19 considerations we will examine in detail
here, it is not an overstatement to say that that the process of diagnosis––
of which testing for infectious disease is an element––is the cornerstone of
modern clinical medicine. This is because before the treatment or
prognostic evaluation of any patient can begin, there must be at least a
working diagnosis––some idea of what is causing the problem that brought
the patient into the clinic in the first place. If a clinician does not begin the
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clinical encounter by working to obtain an accurate, or at least close to
accurate, diagnosis, then subsequent treatments prescribed for the patient
are likely to be ineffective, and prognoses to be inaccurate. This means that
clinicians must be concerned with the questions of when, how, and why to
test their patients in order to best facilitate their individual health outcomes.
But diagnostic testing also has purposes beyond that of facilitating the
clinical care of individual patients: it can also be used as an inclusion
criterion for clinical trials, or in certain cases to surveil for, contain, and/or
mitigate disease. In these cases, the goals of the testing are different from
those of clinical care, and so are the ethical issues that arise when testing
is conducted in these other domains. All of these different purposes for
testing are present in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, but they are
not always carefully separated, and the running together of testing for
clinical care and surveillance, in particular, has raised some important
ethical and philosophical difficulties.
In this paper we will consider some of these difficulties via an exploration
of the concept of diagnostic justice (Kennedy 2021) in the context of the
COVID-19 pandemic, by examining the overlapping categories and the
philosophical issues that arise out of diagnostic testing for clinical trial
inclusion, public health surveillance, and testing to facilitate the clinical
care of individual patients. In particular, we will focus on two areas of
difficulty that require closer scrutiny: the possibility that individuals could
confuse the goals of testing for public health surveillance with testing for
clinical care, and the way that testing data is used to inform public health
decision-making. We will argue that both of these areas raise issues of
diagnostic justice regarding how testing is conducted and how testing data
is utilized in managing the pandemic.1 Our aim here is to point out two
areas of difficulty that require further investigation and fine tuning of
testing policy in the future. The COVID-19 pandemic is still, as of the
writing of this paper, very much underway, and there remains much to be
learned about the global response to it. This paper is thus written in the
spirit of raising some questions that deserve reflection and analysis as the
entire world endeavors to understand what has happened (and is
happening) during this period, and to prepare for future global health
emergencies.

1

We refrain here from offering any judgment on whether testing policy for COVID-19 has failed to
meet demands of diagnostic justice. The situation is still emergent, and we believe a sober judgment
will need to be made retrospectively, once the pandemic is under control and there is more evidence
available. We thank an audience at Georgetown University, for pushing us to clarify our aims here.
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In the following section we will survey the different forms of testing for
COVID-19 and then in section 3 we will outline some of the ethical issues
that arise when these testing methods are employed. In section 4 we will
discuss the idea of diagnostic justice and argue that issues of justice are
generated by the uses of diagnostic testing in different settings. In section
5 we will raise two ethical difficulties regarding diagnostic justice for
COVID-19 testing. We will then draw out some implications of this
discussion for diagnostic justice, testing, and global public health policy in
section 6, before a brief conclusion in section 7.

2.

COVID-19 Testing Methods

Types of tests
There are three main types of tests currently in use for the
diagnosis/detection of COVID-19 infection. Two of them (PCR testing and
antigen testing) are used to detect active infection, while the third (antibody
testing) is used to detect past infection with the SARS-CoV-2 virus. The
PCR test for COVID-19 infection is considered to be highly accurate, but
at this time no data on the exact sensitivity or specificity of the test is
available, because there is no gold standard to compare it to. However,
estimates based on similar PCR tests for other diseases put the specificity
of the COVID-19 test very high (close to 100 percent, barring lab or
technician error), but sensitivity only at around 70 percent, due to the
relative frequency of inadequate sampling as well as the disease’s variable
incubation period (estimated as 2-14 days). Antigen testing, on the other
hand, has the benefit of delivering results quickly (usually in about 15-20
minutes), which can be useful in point-of-care treatment for patients, but it
is less sensitive than PCR testing and thus delivers more false negative
results.
Antibody testing, in contrast to PCR and antigen testing, is used to confirm
a past infection with the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Because measuring antibody
levels in a large segment of the population can help to determine how much
of the population is or was infected with the virus, which in turn allows for
an estimation of the level of herd immunity present in that population,
antibody testing can be very useful for public health surveillance. Of
course, measuring antibody levels in a population in order to estimate herd
immunity is useful only if naturally derived antibodies do indeed provide
immunity to the disease. Given preliminary data, this does seem to be a
reasonable assumption (Spellberg et. al. 2021) in the case of COVID-19.

8

Ashley Graham Kennedy and Bryan Cwik: Diagnostic justice

Test Uses
In the clinical setting, COVID-19 testing is conducted on individuals for
the purpose of diagnosing those patients who are either symptomatic, or
who have had recent exposure to the virus, in order to facilitate their
individual case management. In the context of a research trial, on the other
hand, potential participants are tested as an inclusion criterion for the trial,
in order to make sure that symptoms are due to COVID-19, rather than
other respiratory infections or disorders. In the public health domain, there
are at least three reasons why a COVID-19 test might be conducted: for
screening, for passive surveillance, or for active surveillance. According
to the CDC,
The primary purpose of screening is to identify early signs and
symptoms of a disease or health problem to implement early
treatment or program intervention to reduce the likelihood of
the emergence of disease or health problem and/or mortality
from the disease in an individual. (Oleske 2009, 131)
So far, COVID-19 tests have not been used for this purpose, although it is
possible that in the future, especially if early treatment or prevention
measures become available, that they might be. COVID-19 tests can also
be used for the purpose of passive surveillance, which “is intended to
monitor community- or population-level outbreak of disease, or to
characterize the incidence and prevalence of disease” (Center for Disease
Control and Prevention 2020). Surveillance testing is performed on deidentified specimens, usually via antibody titer on samples obtained from
clinics or hospitals, and thus the results are not linked to individual patients
or participants. Because of this, surveillance testing cannot be used for
individual patient care, however it is often used as decision-input for
population level health interventions (Oleske 2009). The sort of testing for
COVID-19 that is most often conducted in the public health domain is for
the purpose of active surveillance. Confusingly, sometimes the literature
(and the CDC) refers to this also as “screening”. However, the purpose of
this kind of testing is different than screening, because the goal is not to
treat or prevent disease in individuals, but rather to
identify infected persons who are asymptomatic and without
known or suspected exposure to SARS-CoV-2. [It] is
performed to identify persons who may be contagious so that
measures can be taken to prevent further transmission. (Oleske
2009, 139)
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In practice, however, this theoretically strict separation of goals often
becomes blurred, and both participants in trials and the researchers that
conduct them are forced to navigate potentially complicated situations. As
an example, consider the role of testing in AIDS vaccine trials. Testing
during AIDS vaccine field trials is essential in order to collect data on the
efficacy of vaccine candidates. There is, quite simply, no way to know
whether a vaccine is working or not without the testing of the subjects in
the trial. Further, because of the manner of presentation and progressive
nature of the disease, testing for HIV infection is necessary for the
diagnosis of AIDS. What this means in practice is that while subjects can
of course refuse to participate in the trial altogether, or to withdraw from
the trial at any time, they cannot refuse testing and at the same time remain
in the trial; if they are not able to consent to testing, then they cannot
participate. However, during AIDS vaccine trials, testing also often ends
up serving a de facto clinical function. Because these trials are mostly
staged in developing countries with high baseline transmission rates, or in
populations with a high risk of HIV infection, there is a significant chance
that, even despite counseling, provision of different services, and of course
some individuals getting the vaccine candidate itself, individuals in (but
not only in) control groups will become HIV positive. There has been a
longstanding debate about the obligations researchers have to subjects in
these trials who become HIV positive during the course of the research
(Berkley 2003). It is now generally accepted that researchers have some
obligations to provide some form of care and support for HIV positive
research subjects enrolled in clinical trials for HIV/AIDS therapeutics,
such as the provision of antiretroviral medication and financial support for
health infrastructure in communities from which participants are drawn
(Richardson 2007). This means that in the course of conducting diagnostic
testing for HIV infection for research purposes, data from this testing also
has a clinical function, in that it identifies individuals that are (potentially)
owed some form of care as part of the duty researchers owe to participants.
So, while superficially similar to the ethical issues involved with
diagnostic testing in clinical care, testing as part of clinical research raises
different concerns.
Public Health
Diagnostic testing for public health reasons is subject to a seemingly
similar issue as is testing that is used in the context of clinical research, in
that its primary goal is not (necessarily) to benefit the individuals
submitting to the testing, but rather to protect the public health as a whole.
But, as in the case of clinical research, there is, in practice, often a blurring
of these goals. For example, submitting to testing to provide pieces of
aggregate data for public health purposes can also have an important
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clinical benefit for individuals, as it allows them to also provide
information to their providers that can help to facilitate their own care.
However, this blurring of clinical medicine vs. public health raises some
difficulties for the ethics of COVID-19 testing, which we will discuss in
section 5 below.
When it comes to the question of whether individuals can refuse testing for
public health purposes, the situation is far murkier than it is with clinical
research. With passive surveillance, individuals can refuse testing without
compromising the public health goals of collection of data, as long as there
is a sufficient sample who will submit to testing (or some form of proxy
data that can be gathered instead). But with active surveillance, the
situation is different. This sort of testing, for example, is often required for
things like crossing borders where mandatory quarantine orders or travel
restrictions are in effect. Refusing to submit to testing in this kind of
context can be grounds for the barring of entry or even for forcing
individuals into mandatory quarantine. Active surveillance requires a high
volume of testing; during the COVID-19 pandemic, different countries
have taken different tacks when it comes to mandating testing during active
surveillance. Though compelling testing (as in China) raises some serious
ethical questions, leaving testing voluntary (as has been the case in the
United States) raises its own difficulties (which we will also discuss in
section 5 below).
There is an enduring question here about whether testing for public health
surveillance can be compelled. On the one hand, there is a clear public
health rationale based on prevention of harms to others for making testing
mandatory, at least in certain circumstances.
On the other hand, as we will argue in the next two sections, the way testing
data is used is not morally inert. Compelling individuals to submit to
testing, and then using data in ways that either results in an inequitable
distribution of the burdens of mitigation or neglects obligations of care to
individuals would raise serious concerns. Whether compelling testing is
justifiable, then, depends on a number of factors. Some of these factors are
unique to the situation of testing for disease surveillance in public health,
and some are shared with other domains in which diagnostic testing is
employed (as we’ve noted, with testing for clinical research, where
compelling testing as a condition of participation also raises questions
about ancillary duties of care).2 So, the ethics of diagnostic testing for an
2

We offer here no opinion on whether testing for COVID-19 in situations where it was left voluntary
(such as in community testing in the United States) should have been mandatory. No general opinion
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infectious disease such as COVID-19, while it raises some common
questions in all scenarios (such as questions about a right to refuse a test
as well as about balancing different goals of testing), is sensitive to
differences in context between clinical care, clinical research, and public
health settings. Understanding these differences is crucial to understanding
the concerns of diagnostic justice raised by testing for public health
purposes.

3.

Diagnostic Justice

In biomedical ethics much has been written about the idea of justice as
fairness, particularly as it relates to the allocation of treatments to patients,
especially when these treatments are scarce resources in the community
(Beauchamp and Childress 2020; Emanuel, et. al. 2020; Truog et. al 2020).
However, at least to our knowledge, this concept has not been discussed in
regard to diagnostic testing. It is our view, however, that in the case of
diagnostic testing, as with health care generally, there are multiple, and
sometimes competing, moral considerations that come into play when
making decisions about allocating testing resources, using data, and
compelling (or not compelling) individuals to submit to testing. In some
instances, there are not enough diagnostic tests to go around (as was the
case in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States),
while in other cases, even when there is an adequate supply of tests, the act
of testing itself can have differential impacts on the individuals being
tested (this is further discussed in section 5, below) and thus there arise
distributive considerations in how testing should be used and what
resources should made available to those who submit to testing. In our
view, what this means is that diagnostic testing is subject to demands of
diagnostic justice (Kennedy 2021). That is, diagnostic justice requires both
that the burdens and benefits of testing be distributed equitably and that
diagnostic resources be allocated fairly. Thus, diagnostic justice, like other
forms of justice,

is possible, as the rationale for compelling testing is sensitive to highly local factors––any justification
for compelling testing will depend at least to some degree on how much harm results from a voluntary
testing regime, and this will always be something that must be settled on a case-by-case basis. All we
want to argue here is that, unlike in testing for clinical care, testing as part of public health surveillance
could in principle be compelled, and that the differences between these circumstances make a moral
difference on this issue of compelling diagnostic testing. Further, there is more going on here than just
a trade-off between patient autonomy and prevention of harms to others. Adjudicating whether testing
can be made mandatory requires considering issues about how data is used and whether there are
ancillary obligations owed to test subjects––or in short, requires considering diagnostic justice. Thanks
to an anonymous referee for pushing for clarification on this point.
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requires equality by default if: (a) there are not any relevant
distinguishing feature between people that legitimate unequal
distribution of advantages and disadvantages or (b) we do not
have reliable ways of identifying and measuring the unequal
claims people may have. (Lysdahl and Hoffman 2021, 21)
For our purposes, what is considered just or unjust when it comes to the
ethical considerations of diagnostic testing will depend on the primary
context in which the test is being used or conducted. That is, the purpose
of testing in clinical settings, as we have seen, differs from the purpose of
testing in the research trial setting, which in turn also differs from the
purpose of testing in the public health setting, and these differences give
rise to different ethical considerations. The ethical considerations and
implications differ between these domains because the considerations of
why to test as well as whom to test differ.
The answer to the why and whom questions in the clinical setting is that
tests should be performed on symptomatic patients in whom the test result
would be likely to change the course of their clinical care (in terms of either
treatment or supportive measures). If tests are scarce, however, and there
are not enough such that all symptomatic patients can receive one, then
distribution decisions should be made as fairly as possible. In the context
of a research trial, on the other hand, the demands of diagnostic justice
differ: testing should be conducted only on symptomatic patients in this
context when it is not known whether or not the test results would change
the course of their clinical care in any significant way.3
Finally, in the context of public health, the answer to the why and whom to
test questions is that the goal of testing is to contain the disease and testing
should therefore be performed as widely, and on as many individuals, as
possible (or at least, as is necessary for mitigation or successful
surveillance). Further, the idea behind requiring testing in this context is
that it would further the goal of mitigation or containment measures: the
more people who are tested, the more likely it is that the disease will be
successfully contained, especially if those in the population who test
positive for active infection can be effectively isolated from others. This
3

This epistemic requirement that it not be known ahead of time whether or not the treatment is
effective is known as the principle of equipoise (Freedman 1987). According to Freedman, equipoise
is the state of genuine uncertainty within the expert medical community on the best treatment for a
condition. Thus it is a state that exists when some physicians or researchers favor one treatment (or
expect it to work) while others favor another (or do not expect the one being tested to work). The idea
is that this epistemic principle should be adhered to because if it is already known prior to the trial that
the treatment works, then running the trial is a waste of time and financial resources, while, on the
other hand, if it is already known prior to the trial that the treatment does not work, then the trial
participants will be put at potential risk for no reason.
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raises different distribution and allocation questions than in the case of
clinical uses of testing for treatment. By way of partial analogy, in the
context of justice in treatment allocation, in general, there are few
restrictions on a competent adult patient’s right to refuse a treatment
measure or intervention (Flanigan 2017), although there might be
restrictions on a patient’s right to request these things. However, this is not
as clearly the case when it comes to diagnostic testing for active
surveillance purposes. In this situation, diagnostic testing is conducted not
(solely) for the benefit of the individual being tested, but also to protect
others in the society of which the infected person is a part.4
Thus the answer to the question of whether it is sometimes, always, or
never acceptable to force individuals to be tested in the public health
context will depend on how one settles distributive questions about the
burdens of testing when it comes to containment/mitigation measures
specifically. In considering how testing resources are allocated and how
the burdens and benefits of testing are distributed, the concept of diagnostic
justice provides a lens through which to evaluate how these tensions can
be resolved and how the different moral demands on testing can be
balanced. For example, imagine that you (unfortunately) find yourself in
the emergency department of your local hospital with a diagnosis of sepsis.
The treatment for this condition is intravenous antibiotic therapy, generally
with two or three agents (Schmidt and Mandel 2020). But suppose that the
attending physician in this case decides not to treat you because she is
aware that the more often any given antibiotic is prescribed, the more likely
it is that bacteria in the community will develop resistance to it. So, she
decides not to treat you in order to preserve the antibiotics’ effectiveness
(Kennedy 2021). We might or might not agree with this physician’s
decision, however, what we can agree on is that she is, in the process of
making this decision, weighing the benefit of the intervention to the
individual vs. the risk of the intervention to society at large. That is, what
she is doing is weighing in on what is the most just all-things-considered
action to take in the situation. This is the sort of normative reasoning that
is also required when making testing/diagnostic decisions in the clinical,
research and public health settings. And, in our view, this reasoning can be
facilitated by taking into consideration the principle of diagnostic justice.

4

This is similar to the situation with vaccination––which is done not just for the benefit of the
individual, but also for the benefit of the society in which that person resides.
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4.

Two Outstanding Difficulties in COVID Testing

Testing for COVID-19 that is part of active surveillance and mitigation
efforts, as well as screening for the disease to inform quarantine decisions
or travel restrictions, raises two difficulties when it comes to diagnostic
justice. These difficulties are outstanding, in the sense that they have not
been adequately addressed in testing policy and thus different kinds of
COVID-19 testing policies may fail to meet the demands of diagnostic
justice. Though testing for COVID-19 as part of the response to the
pandemic was put together on the fly in the face of the global health
emergency posed by the disease, it is important to understand these
difficulties so as to fine tune testing policy for future public health
emergencies.
A Diagnostic Misconception?5
A central tenet of the ethics of clinical research since the Belmont Report
has been the separation of therapy from research (Emanuel et al. 2000).
Revelations about the deeply unethical Tuskegee Syphilis studies in the
United States showed that blurring boundaries between research and
therapy can cause enormous difficulties, making exploitation of subjects
much easier and complicating the exercise of an individual’s right to
withdraw from an experiment, among other issues.6 It is generally accepted
that, in order for clinical research to be ethical, therapy must be detached
from research, in practice and in the understanding of research subjects.
Public health surveillance is similarly detached from therapy, in that the
goals of public health surveillance are different from the goals of individual
patient therapy. However, as happens in clinical research, individuals may
not understand this difference. Patients’ participation in research because
they mistake it for therapy is known as the therapeutic misconception
(Applebaum et al. 1987; Miller and Rosenstein 2003). The therapeutic
misconception raises significant problems for clinical research; it may
compromise informed consent, particularly in cases where participants
may believe that participation in the trial is actually tantamount to a novel
form of treatment, when in fact they may be assigned to a control group

5

We owe Peter Jaworski for suggesting this term to us.
It is necessary to note that a complicating factor in this case is the deep and abiding systemic racism
present in the United States, which shaped the Tuskegee case and was responsible for so many of its
features. The issue in Tuskegee was not just that there was a blurring of the researcher/clinician roles,
it was that Black individuals were preyed upon and treated as research materials in the guise of
providing them with “care”.
6
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and may receive little to no (medical) benefit from the trial at all.7 How to
deal with the therapeutic misconception in clinical trials has been a
significant subject of debate (Applebaum et al. 1987).
Something very much like the therapeutic misconception may be operating
in instances of disease surveillance as well. Individuals who consent to
testing may not fully understand how their testing data will be used by
public health decision-makers, may not understand procedures such as the
deidentification of data or its use in contact tracing, and may believe that
by submitting to testing, they will be facilitating their own clinical care. As
an analogy, consider a study of adults in the UK about their attitudes
towards contact tracing via smartphone (Williams et al. 2021). In this study
researchers found that misconceptions about contact tracing data were
widespread; individuals believed that contact tracing data would allow
others to identify themselves, believed that contact tracing data had a kind
of diagnostic function (to identify close contacts with COVID-19 so that
they could understand their own risk of exposure), and did not understand
how the data was being used by the government. What attitudes individuals
have towards testing is an empirical question, and no doubt there will be
significant research on this in the future; but it is not hard to imagine that
similar misconceptions are involved with COVID-19 testing, at least at the
present time.
This poses a difficulty relating to diagnostic justice for three reasons. First,
individuals may be submitting to testing based on mistaken understandings
of the use of the data and the purpose of the testing. As in the case of the
therapeutic misconception in research ethics, this may compromise
individuals’ ability to give informed consent. Second, these
misconceptions may be playing a part in motivating participation in testing
in ways that raises worries about exploitation. In countries such as the
United States where testing has been voluntary, it is possible that beliefs
about the clinical relevance of testing data have played a part in individuals
submitting to testing. And third, the opposite may be occurring––
misconceptions about testing may play a part in keeping some individuals
from submitting to testing at all, thus complicating the active surveillance
measures necessary to mitigate the pandemic.
Added together, this raises a question about whether testing policy is
exploiting these misconceptions to gather data. If that is the case, then
testing policy, in order to be effective for active surveillance, would be
7

They may be benefited in that they identify with the goals of the trial, and so even if participation
doesn’t impact their health, they may consider it a benefit to have helped further the goals of the trial.
Hans Jonas famously argued that identification with the goals of a clinical trial in this strong sense was
a necessary condition for a clinical trial to be morally acceptable (Jonas 1969).
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depending on a widespread diagnostic misconception––to perform active
surveillance, testing policy is intentionally leaving a fuzzy line between
clinical and public health uses of testing, and depending on the fuzziness
of the situation to leave a gap in which individuals are motivated to seek
testing under mistaken pretenses. This is an issue of diagnostic justice
because it raises a major concern about fairness––if individuals are seeking
testing because they believe it is part of getting care, and yet it neither
furthers their own care goals nor is necessary for individual care,
individuals are taking on the burden (however minimal that burden is) of
testing without any benefit.8
As with some forms of clinical research, testing for COVID-19
surveillance also involves blurred lines between the collecting of data for
research and the collecting of data for therapeutic purposes. Ideally, these
two domains, along with their differing aims and ethical considerations
should be kept separate. However, during public health emergencies, these
lines are almost necessarily blurred. Clinicians become researchers and
vice versa and are suddenly tasked with the considerations of both
knowledge acquisition and patient care. We have seen this in the current
pandemic, as data gathered in the course of the clinical care of COVID-19
patients has both been made public and has been used to inform public
health decision-making. For example, testing data from clusters identified
at the beginning of the pandemic were instrumental in establishing that the
disease is spread via aerosol transmission (Hamner et al. 2020). Unlike in
(well-designed) clinical trials, there are no clear protocols on how to keep
these roles separate. Further, this blurring of clinical and public health
surveillance roles for testing and data gathering, both in the understanding
of individuals submitting to testing and in the practices of both clinicians
and researchers, could pose significant problems in the future. This is an
area that requires further investigation and would greatly benefit from the
development of clear protocols.
Use of Data and Impacts on Communities
It is well recognized that participation in research does not always benefit
the individual participants involved, and because of this, what benefits are
owed to research subjects has itself been a subject of intense debate within
the ethics of clinical research (Richardson 2012).
Similarly, participation in active surveillance by submitting to testing does
not always benefit individuals or even their communities, and in fact can
be used to inform decision-making that could potentially harm these
8

Thanks to an anonymous referee, for pushing us to clarify this point.
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communities. One of the major features of the COVID-19 pandemic has
been the significant disparities in morbidity/mortality rates among
different communities, with Hispanic, Latinx, Black, Indigenous, and
Pacific Islander populations disproportionately affected by the disease
(Hooper et al. 2020). These dynamics were noticed very early on in the
pandemic, and yet data gathered from surveillance has done little to make
a dent in this disparity. This is a significant concern for diagnostic justice;
if testing as part of active surveillance reveals such significant and morally
arbitrary disparities, it should, ideally, also inform policies that address
these problems. Yet in the case of COVID-19, the opposite has been the
case; upticks in infections revealed by active surveillance testing informed
policies that seemed to have little to no impact on these disparities. A vivid
example of this has been the US state of California, where an early
lockdown likely mitigated the impact of the pandemic in the early months
of the pandemic (Friedson et al. 2021), but where there have been massive
disparities between lower-income and higher-income communities and
white and Latinx communities in their respective burdens of COVID-19
morbidity and mortality (Hsu and Hayes-Bautista 2021). Why data
revealed from active surveillance indicated these disparities but policy did
not adjust accordingly is a major issue that must be addressed in the wake
of the pandemic. If active surveillance reveals such a disparity, but policy
does nothing to ameliorate it, this looks like a significant failure of
diagnostic justice, as the public health purposes of testing and compliance
with testing requirements by community members did not result in any
action that ameliorated the effects of the pandemic.
The primary function of data gathered from active surveillance has, so far,
been to inform when to impose different restrictions on businesses,
schools, and other public activities. Different communities have
experimented with various metrics in an effort to determine when it is safe
to permit school openings, religious services, dine-in service at restaurants,
and the like. As an example, New York City, in the United States,
established fairly early on in the pandemic a metric of a 3% test positivity
rate for opening public schools (Shapiro 2020). These restrictions,
however, do not benefit or harm everyone equally; in New York City, the
effects of closing public schools have primarily been felt by lower-income
communities (Agostinelli et al. 2020). There are also worries about the
disproportionate long-term effects of lockdowns from lost income, mental
health impacts, and the like (Winsberg et al. 2020).9 During the COVID19 pandemic, testing data has informed these policies. Testing data, then,
9

We bracket here any comment on Winsberg et al.’s claim that these long-term effects show that tradeoffs from lockdowns raise a high epistemic barrier to imposing such lockdowns, and that this barrier
was not met in the early months of the pandemic (Winsberg et al. 2020).

18

Ashley Graham Kennedy and Bryan Cwik: Diagnostic justice

can be used in such a way that informs policy-decisions that impose
burdens, but in which burdens are not distributed equitably, in which
burdens fall disproportionately on some communities and not others. If
testing data gathered during active surveillance informs policies that not
only do not ameliorate the impacts of the pandemic on disproportionately
affected communities, but actually generate some significant harms of their
own, then this also looks like a significant failure of diagnostic justice.

5.

Implications

Our discussion of diagnostic testing and diagnostic justice has implications
not just for COVID-19 testing but for testing policy for future public health
emergencies. As we have seen, testing for COVID-19 as part of active
surveillance efforts can involve a blurring of the boundaries between
public health and clinical medicine. Since test results are obviously
relevant for an individual’s health, testing as part of active surveillance and
mitigation efforts at least has some relevance for individuals, even if that
is not the primary goal of the testing. Given this, it may be that testers have
obligations to individuals who report for testing as part of active
surveillance efforts, even if the primary aim is not clinical but is to provide
data for mitigation efforts. These obligations, for testing as part of active
surveillance, may be minimal: timely return of results, clinical advice and
direction to care resources, communication of results to individuals in a
clear fashion, and the like may be sufficient to discharge the duties
resulting from the partial entrustment of individuals’ health to testers.
However minimal, meeting these requirements may be necessary to ensure
that benefits from testing are distributed equitably. Some individuals may
be better placed to take advantage of information gained from testing
without additional resources or aid from public health officials. Building
in resources to meet obligations of care to those who submit to testing may
be necessary to help remove these inequities, and ensure that those who
submit to testing receive some (clinical) benefit from doing so, as well as
those who benefit from mitigation efforts.
Though minimal, this hasn’t always been the case with active surveillance
measures during epidemics. During the 2013-2016 Upper West Africa
Ebola epidemic, the focus throughout, from the very earliest days, was on
containment, instead of care (Farmer 2020). Pressure from the world
community on Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia led to a channeling of
resources into identification and isolation of cases, in the hopes of breaking
transmission chains, and this extended as well to testing and contact
tracing. Much of the containment and mitigation effort was put in the hands
of the military, which employed coercive measures aimed at containment
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(such as the infamous cordon sanitaire) (McNeill 2014). As the medical
historian Frank Snowden argues, the response to Ebola involved a
resurrection of the tactics used to fight infectious disease in the dark ages
of medicine, rather than a 21st century, biomedically sophisticated effort
aimed at both care and mitigation:
Many of the coercive means adopted echoed early modern
Europe’s effort to defend itself against bubonic plague (…).
Compulsory treatment facilities surrounded by troops even
closely resembled lazarettos. Daniel Defoe would have found
the response familiar. (Snowden 2019, 495).
Besides the obvious wrong of failing to provide even minimal supportive
care to those suffering from Ebola Virus Disease, this also hampered
mitigation efforts, as the (correct) perception that public health authorities
(including some, but not all, foreign support) were more interested in
containment than in caring for the sick sowed distrust and resentment, and
led to (sometimes violent) backlash among the population of the three most
affected countries. Though testing during the Upper West African Ebola
epidemic was not nearly on the scale of the current worldwide efforts to
test for SARS-CoV-2, and there are many relevant differences in the
dynamics of the two epidemics, the contrast between the two events shows
how employing active surveillance without providing any clinical support
leads not just to serious harms but is counterproductive to mitigation. 10
This has important implications for global health ethics and public health
policy looking forward: the separation of care from mitigation is neither
normatively nor practically possible, and active surveillance measures,
including testing for this purpose, must recognize the requirements of care
to the individuals being tested in order to equitably distribute the burdens
and benefits of testing, even if the primary goals of surveillance are not
clinical.

6.

Conclusion

We have argued in this paper that considerations of diagnostic justice
generate moral demands on testing policy as part of public health
10

There are many reasons, of course, for the differences between the two events: the Upper West
Africa Ebola epidemic occurred in a region with minimal clinical resources (Farmer 2020), the
epidemic was concentrated in Upper West Africa despite some sporadic imported infections (and
limited secondary transmission) elsewhere in Africa, Europe, and the United States, and the different
stigmas, biases, and prejudices about Ebola and those suffering most from it during the epidemic made
it far easier to “other” those in need of care and thus to direct resources elsewhere than has been the
case with COVID-19, although there is also plenty of stereotyping of individuals susceptible to the
disease in the latter case as well (Aronson 2020).
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surveillance during infectious disease epidemics. The current and ongoing
SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 pandemic has revealed many of the dynamics
involved with testing as part of active surveillance during these events and
provided important lessons for the general question of what would
constitute an ethical testing regime for active surveillance during
epidemics. This, unfortunately, looks likely to be a significant question for
global health in the foreseeable future. The first two decades of the 21st
century have already seen a number of significant public health events
involving novel and emerging pathogens––SARS, H1N1, Ebola, and now
COVID-19. Collectively, these have already cost the lives of millions of
people, in the form of premature death from infection and illness. There
are plenty of reasons to believe this is not just bad luck; some of the
dynamics of our world––further encroachment into the wildland-urban
interface (which provides increased opportunities for zoonosis),
intensifying urbanization of the world’s population, the high volume of
international air travel, and continuing, morally pernicious disparities in
access to basic health care resources in many parts of the world––all
provide ample opportunities for emerging pathogens to spark epidemics
(Bollyky 2018). 11 A just and sustainable world will require just and
sustainable global health policy, which includes testing protocols for
public health surveillance that meet the demands of diagnostic justice.

Acknowledgments
Versions of this paper were presented at the Georgetown Institute for the
Study of Markets and Ethics at Georgetown University in April 2021, and
the Philosophical Perspectives on COVID-19 Workshop at the University
of Johannesburg in May 2021. Thanks to audiences at both, for their
helpful comments and suggestions (and thanks to Sahar Akhtar for inviting
us to Georgetown and to Alex Broadbent for organizing the Johannesburg
workshop). The idea for this paper came out of an exchange between both
authors during the Q&A for a presentation one author (Kennedy) gave to

11

The causal claims involved in theories about the vulnerability of the contemporary world to
infectious disease generate interesting questions in the philosophy of science in their own right; but
some of the narratives and rhetoric in the presentation of these claims can echo problematic ideas about
developing countries from past decades. Some of this is the case with Bollyky’s treatment, especially
his discussion of the role of urbanization in developing countries and population increases due to
progress in combating childhood mortality (Bollyky 2018). Others draw different lessons; Deaton
(2013) and Farmer (2020), for instance, see the unique zoonotic opportunities provided by urbanization
and encroachment on the urban-wildland interface in developing countries as evidence of the severe
risks and injustices posed by lack of public health infrastructure and clinical resources; or rather, as
evidence not that, as Bollyky puts it, “the world is getting healthier in worrisome ways”, but rather that
persistent injustices in access to health care and other basic goods create significant risks for all.

21

EuJAP | Vol. 17 | No. 2 | 2021

Special issue Philosophy of medicine article 1

the PDXPhiSciNOW philosophy of the life sciences workshop in
December 2020. Thanks to Mark Bedau for organizing the workshop.

REFERENCES
Agostinelli, Francesco, Matthias Doepke, Giuseppe Sorrenti, and Fabrizio
Zilibotti. 2020. “When the Great Equalizer Shuts down: Schools,
Peers, and Parents in Pandemic Times.” w28264. Cambridge,
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
https://doi.org/10.3386/w28264.
Appelbaum, P. S., L. H. Roth, C. W. Lidz, P. Benson, and W. Winslade.
1987. “False Hopes and Best Data: Consent to Research and the
Therapeutic Misconception.” The Hastings Center Report 17 (2):
20–24.
Aronson, Louise. 2020. “Age, Complexity, and Crisis — a Prescription for
Progress in Pandemic.” New England Journal of Medicine 383
(1): 4–6. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp2006115.
Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. 2020. Principles of
Biomedical Ethics. 8th ed. New York: Oxford University Press.
Begley, Sharon. 2020. “Who Is Getting Sick? A Breakdown of
Coronavirus Risk by Demographic Factors.” STAT (blog). March
3, 2020. https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/03/who-is-gettingsick-and-how-sick-a-breakdown-of-coronavirus-risk-bydemographic-factors/.
Berkley, Seth. 2003. “Thorny Issues in the Ethics of AIDS Vaccine Trials.”
Lancet 362 (9388): 992. https://doi.org/10.1016/S01406736(03)14371-1.
Bollyky, Thomas J. 2018. Plagues and the Paradox of Progress: Why the
World Is Getting Healthier in Worrisome Ways. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Center for Disease Control and Prevention. 2020. “Testing Strategies
for SARS-CoV-2.” Center for Disease Control and Prevention.
February 11, 2020. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/lab/resources/sars-cov2-testing-strategies.html.
Cheng, Matthew P., Jesse Papenburg, Michaël Desjardins, Sanjat Kanjilal,
Caroline Quach, Michael Libman, Sabine Dittrich, and Cedric P.
Yansouni. 2020. “Diagnostic Testing for Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome–Related Coronavirus-2.” Annals of
Internal Medicine, M20-1301. https://doi.org/10.7326/M201301.
Deaton, Angus. 2013. The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins
of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

22

Ashley Graham Kennedy and Bryan Cwik: Diagnostic justice

Emanuel, E. J., D. Wendler, and C. Grady. 2000. “What Makes Clinical
Research Ethical?” JAMA 283 (20): 2701–11.
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.283.20.2701.
Emanuel, Ezekiel J., Govind Persad, Ross Upshur, Beatriz Thome,
Michael Parker, Aaron Glickman, Cathy Zhang, Connor Boyle,
Maxwell Smith, and James P. Phillips. 2020. “Fair Allocation of
Scarce Medical Resources in the Time of Covid-19.” New
England Journal of Medicine 382 (21): 2049–55.
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsb2005114.
Farmer, Paul. 2020. Fevers, Feuds, and Diamonds: Ebola and the Ravages
of History. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Flanigan, Jessica. 2014. “A Defense of Compulsory Vaccination.” HEC
Forum: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Hospitals’ Ethical and
Legal Issues 26 (1): 5–25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10730-0139221-5.
———. 2017. Pharmaceutical Freedom: Why Patients Have a Right to
Self-Medicate. New York: Oxford University Press.
Freedman, B. 1987. “Equipoise and the Ethics of Clinical Research.” The
New England Journal of Medicine 317 (3): 141–45.
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJM198707163170304.
Friedson, Andrew I., Drew McNichols, Joseph J. Sabia, and Dhaval Dave.
2021. “Shelter‐in‐place Orders and Public Health: Evidence from
California during the Covid‐19 Pandemic.” Journal of Policy
Analysis and Management 40 (1): 258–83.
https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.22267.
Furukawa, Nathan W., John T. Brooks, and Jeremy Sobel. 2020.
“Evidence Supporting Transmission of Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome Coronavirus 2 While Presymptomatic or
Asymptomatic - Volume 26, Number 7—July 2020 - Emerging
Infectious Diseases Journal––Cdc.” Accessed November 9,
2021.
https://doi.org/10.3201/eid2607.201595.
Hamner, Lea, Polly Dubbel, Ian Capron, Andy Ross, Amber Jordan, Jaxon
Lee, Joanne Lynn, et al. 2020. “High Sars-CoV-2 Attack Rate
Following Exposure at a Choir Practice—Skagit County,
Washington, March 2020.” MMWR. Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report 69 (19): 606–10.
https://doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6919e6.
Hsu, Paul, and David E. Hayes-Bautista. 2021. “The Epidemiology of
Diversity: Covid-19 Case Rate Patterns in California.” Journal
of Immigrant and Minority Health 23 (4): 857–62.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10903-021-01159-x.
Jonas, Hans. 1969. “Philosophical Reflections on Experimenting with
Human Subjects.” Daedalus 98 (2): 219–47.

23

EuJAP | Vol. 17 | No. 2 | 2021

Special issue Philosophy of medicine article 1

Jr, Donald G. McNeil. 2014. “Using a Tactic Unseen in a Century,
Countries Cordon off Ebola-Racked Areas.” The New York
Times, 2014, sec. Science.
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/science/using-a-tacticunseen-in-a-century-countries-cordon-off-ebola-rackedareas.html.
Karlsson, Annika C., Marion Humbert, and Marcus Buggert. 2020. “The
Known Unknowns of T Cell Immunity to COVID-19.” Science
Immunology 5 (53): eabe8063.
https://doi.org/10.1126/sciimmunol.abe8063.
Larijani, Mona Sadat, Amitis Ramezani, and Seyed Mehdi Sadat. 2019.
“Updated Studies on the Development of HIV Therapeutic
Vaccine.” Current HIV Research 17 (2): 75–84.
https://doi.org/10.2174/1570162X17666190618160608.
Lasagna, L. 1968. “Some Ethical Problems in Clinical Investigation.”
South African Medical Journal 42 (1): 2–5.
Lysdahl, Kristin Bakke, and Bjørn Hofmann. 2020. “Overutilization of
Imaging Tests and Healthcare Fairness.” In Philosophy of
Advanced Medical Imaging, edited by Elisabetta Lalumera and
Stefano Fanti, 99–111. SpringerBriefs in Ethics. Cham: Springer
International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-03061412-6_8.
Miller, Franklin G., and Donald L. Rosenstein. 2003. “The Therapeutic
Orientation to Clinical Trials.” New England Journal of
Medicine 348 (14): 1383–86.
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMsb030228.
Oleske, Denise M. 2010. “Screening and Surveillance for Promoting
Population Health.” In Epidemiology and the Delivery of Health
Care Services: Methods and Applications, 131–50. Boston, MA:
Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0164-4_5.
Onder, Graziano, Giovanni Rezza, and Silvio Brusaferro. 2020. “CaseFatality Rate and Characteristics of Patients Dying in Relation to
Covid-19 in Italy.” JAMA.
https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.4683.
Paltiel, A. David, Amy Zheng, and Rochelle P. Walensky. 2020.
“Assessment of SARS-CoV-2 Screening Strategies to Permit the
Safe Reopening of College Campuses in the United States.”
JAMA Network Open 3 (7): e2016818.
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.16818.
Richardson, Henry S. 2007. “Gradations of Researchers’ Obligation to
Provide Ancillary Care for HIV/AIDS in Developing Countries.”
American Journal of Public Health 97 (11): 1956–61.
https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2006.093658.

24

Ashley Graham Kennedy and Bryan Cwik: Diagnostic justice

———. 2012. Moral Entanglements: The Ancillary-Care Obligations of
Medical Researchers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, Eliza. 2020. “New York City to Close Public Schools Again as
Virus Cases Rise.” The New York Times, 2020, sec. New York.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/18/nyregion/nyc-schoolscovid.html.
Sharfstein, Joshua M., Scott J. Becker, and Michelle M. Mello. 2020.
“Diagnostic Testing for the Novel Coronavirus.” JAMA 323 (15):
1437–38. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.3864.
Snowden, Frank M. 2019. Epidemics and Society: From the Black Death
to the Present. Open Yale Courses Series. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Spellberg, Brad, Travis B. Nielsen, and Arturo Casadevall. 2021.
“Antibodies, Immunity, and COVID-19.” JAMA Internal
Medicine 181 (4): 460.
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamainternmed.2020.7986.
Truog, Robert D., Christine Mitchell, and George Q. Daley. 2020. “The
Toughest Triage — Allocating Ventilators in a Pandemic.” New
England Journal of Medicine 382 (21): 1973–75.
https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp2005689.
Webb Hooper, Monica, Anna María Nápoles, and Eliseo J. Pérez-Stable.
2020. “Covid-19 and Racial/Ethnic Disparities.” JAMA 323 (24):
2466. https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.8598.
Williams, Simon N., Christopher J. Armitage, Tova Tampe, and Kimberly
Dienes. 2021. “Public Attitudes towards COVID‐19 Contact
Tracing Apps: An UK‐based Focus Group Study.” Health
Expectations 24 (2): 377–85. https://doi.org/10.1111/hex.13179.
Winsberg, Eric, Jason Brennan, and Chris W. Surprenant. 2020. “How
Government Leaders Violated Their Epistemic Duties during the
SARS-CoV-2 Crisis.” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 30 (3):
215–42. https://doi.org/10.1353/ken.2020.0013.

25

EuJAP | Vol. 17 | No. 2 | 2021

26

Special issue Philosophy of medicine article 1

